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The notion of using technology to offset demographic and economic limitations on 
Australia’s military emerged in the early 1970s alongside the concept of defence self-
reliance. It began as a means to bolster Australia’s credibility as a regional security 
partner as US and British presence in Southeast Asia waned. By the twenty-first century 
it became a recurring policy concept and featured in public statements and diplomatic 
signals at the highest levels of government. Although the need for an ‘edge’ in military 
capability was articulated consistently in policy and political statements, the meaning of 
the concept changed over time. This evolution provides insight into key strategic policy 
decisions and offer lessons for scholars, policymakers and analysts alike, but is yet to 
be examined directly. This study traces transformations of the strategic edge concept 
from its emergence in the 1970s through to the twenty-first century. It conducts a 
comparative analysis of publicly-released policy documents and archival records of 
speeches made by Prime Ministers and Ministers for Defence in order to identify the 
ways in which the concept evolved and how transformations were represented in 
political statements. The paper finds that primary drivers of change related to political 
needs rather than internally-consistent policy impetus. Politicians have utilised the 
strategic edge concept in defence debates to reflect and often legitimate political goals 
relating to: changing policy contexts, particularly the scope of Australia's strategic 
ambitions; other strategic concepts, such as ideas about force posturing and the way 
technology should be used to enhance military capability; and different communication 
needs, often the need to signal specific audiences in order to facilitate other policy 
objectives. This politicisation of the edge highlights the need for further scrutiny of ideas 
which inform the interpretation of policy challenges and solutions. 
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Introduction 
Australia spends billions of dollars every year on acquiring and maintaining cutting edge 
defence technology. Currently planned major capital expenditure projects are by far the most 
expensive in Australia’s history.1 Nonetheless, successive governments have upheld 
commitments to ensure that the Australian Defence force (ADF) is equipped with high 
technology weapons and communications systems. This practice began in the 1960s and has 
intensified significantly since. The rationale for maintaining a high-technology defence force 
emerged in Australian strategic policy during the late 1960s and early 1970s, largely in 
response to significant changes in the strategic environment in Southeast Asia caused or 
exacerbated by the waning interest of the US and Britain. Emphasis on Australia’s advanced 
technological and industrial capacity paralleled the emergence of the concept of self-reliance in 
defence at first. However, by the late 1970s technological advantage had become a discrete 
policy concept. Since the 1976 Defence white paper2 the stated policy need for qualitative 
advantage continued to evolve, both in Australian strategic policy and in policy guidance 
delivered publicly by senior politicians. 
 
Impetus for cutting edge technology began as a way to bolster Australia’s credibility as a 
security partner as Canberra’s forward defence ambitions and commitments became less 
reliable. By the twenty-first century it had become a central concept espoused in publicly 
released strategic policy documents and featured prominently in Ministerial public statements 
and diplomatic signals. Yet, the rationale had changed from offsetting vulnerabilities to a 
maintaining a “traditional technological edge in [Australia’s] region.”3 While the need for a cutting 
                                                          
1
 See Department of Defence, Defence capability plan 2009: December 2010 update Canberra: Defence 
Publishing Service, December 2010 
2
 Department of Defence, Australian defence, Defence White paper Canberra: Australian Government 
Publishing Service, 1976 
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 Ray, Robert, Defence into the future: maintaining the edge Canberra: National Press Club, 22 
November 1995, 3 
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edge defence force became an engrained fact of Australian strategic policy over the last forty 
years, the reasons for holding this belief slowly changed without being directly examined. This 
paper clarifies the concept of relative advantage as it was articulated in policy, traces its 
evolution in policy documents and policy statements throughout the period of defence self-
reliance and examines the relationships that existed between relative advantage and other 
concepts which have dominated strategic policy and related discourse. 
 
This study is concerned with the strategic policy discourse in Australia and is focused on the 
concept of an ‘edge’ or advantage in military capability. The broad conceptual family of 
qualitative advantage in military capability stems from a general idea of an edge in military 
technology that emerged and evolved since the late 1960s. For the purposes of this paper, the 
time frame under examination will be broadly labelled the era of defence self-reliance in 
Australian strategic policy.4 Throughout the era of self-reliance a focus on high-technology 
military capability and relative advantage in qualitative terms has underpinned the evolving 
concept of an edge. An umbrella term for the concept under examination is ‘relative qualitative 
advantage in military capability and systems.’ For the purpose of clarity this can be shortened 
to: relative advantage. The concept of relative advantage has featured prominently in 
discussions regarding Australia’s force structure and posture, major acquisitions and strategic 
policy. The study seeks to investigate the evolution of a frequently deployed but hitherto under-
examined political concept. This examination of relative advantage contributes to existing 
debates by introducing unique data and a different perspective to inform policy formulation and 
analysis. 
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 See White, Hugh, "Four decades of the Defence of Australia: reflections on Australian defence policy 
over the past 40 years," History as Policy,  (eds.) Ron Huisken and Thatcher, Meredith Canberra: 
ANU ePress, 2007 
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The paper proceeds in three parts. The first examines the evolution of relative advantage 
throughout the period 1968-2009 in order to demonstrate that there has been a qualitative 
change in the way that the concept has been expressed. The second section examines the role 
of political rhetoric in representing policy ideas which influence institutional thinking and may 
come to frame policy changes.5 It also explains the data set and the research model used to 
analyse the representation of relative advantage in policy documents and statements. The third 
section presents the research findings in four parts. The first examines the period 1968-1979, 
during which relative advantage was conceived primarily in terms of buttressing Australia’s 
credibility as a security partner. The second examines the period 1980-1986, during which 
relative advantage was expressed both in terms of credibility and also technological level as a 
base for expansion of the ADF. The third examines the period 1987-1996, in which relative 
advantage was largely reoriented toward material capability advantage and force multiplication. 
The fourth examines the period 1997-2009, which saw the emergence of communication 
technologies and emphasis on coordination between force elements to maximise effectiveness. 
 
The evolution of relative advantage 
For four decades, Australian defence policy has featured a recurring theme emphasising a 
qualitative lead in military capability. The concept emerged in defence policy and discourse 
during the 1970s at roughly the same time as policy was adopting and then endorsing the notion 
of defence self-reliance. It has featured prominently in major open-source strategic policy 
documents since. The importance of Australia’s technological level was stressed in the 1970s. 
The formal use of relative advantage began in a discussion about the technological level of 
                                                          
5
 See Fischer, Frank, Reframing public policy: discursive politics and deliberative practices Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003; and Cairney, Paul, Understanding Public Policy: Theories and Issues 
Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011 
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Australia’s military forces in the 1975 strategic basis of Australian defence policy.6 The 
technological level had initially referred primarily to Australia’s industrial base and capacity for 
expansion to sustain conventional force generation. Based on ideas that had emerged in the 
early 1970s, the technological level debate sparked a larger discourse about the degree of 
relative advantage that Australia ought to pursue, precisely which countries that advantage 
should be relative to and whether high-technology capabilities were to be prioritised according 
to their capacity for expansion, their deterrent value or their suitability for operational use in low-
level ‘credible contingencies.’7 
 
The conceptualisation of military technology has been a key influence on Australian strategic 
guidance since at least the 1987 defence white paper, the Defence of Australia.8 A ‘clear military 
technological advantage’ relative to Australia’s region9 was cemented in policy as a cornerstone 
of Australia’s capacity to defend itself and contribute to cooperative security arrangements in the 
1980s.10 At this point, the role of technology in providing an advantage had been clearly linked 
to qualitative performance. This reflected not only a change in the role of technology in 
facilitating relative advantage, but also a significant change in the way self-reliant defence was 
conceptualised in policy. Paul Dibb, principal author of the Defence of Australia, noted that the 
                                                          
6
 Defence Committee, Strategic basis of Australian defence policy Canberra: Department of Defence, 3 
October 1975 
7
 Langtry, John Osborne and Ball, Desmond J., Controlling Australia's threat environment: a methodology 
for planning Australian defence force development Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies 
Centre, 1979 58-60; Godfrey-Smith, Tony, Low level conflict contingencies and Australian 
defence policy Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 1985; Joint Committee on 
Foreign Affairs and Defence, The Australian Defence Force: its structure and capabilities 
Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, October 1984 
8
 Department of Defence, The defence of Australia Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 
1987 
9
 Dibb, Paul, "The self-reliant defence of Australia: the history of an idea," History as Policy,  (eds.) Ron 
Huisken and Thatcher, Meredith Canberra: ANU ePress, 2007; 19-20 
10
 Department of Defence, The defence of Australia; Dibb, Paul, Review of Australia's defence capabilities 
Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 16 March 1986; Dibb, Paul, The 
conceptual basis of Australia's defence planning and force structure development Canberra: 
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 1992 
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two key features of the approach to strategic guidance offered by the 1987 white paper were the 
focus on strategic geography and the specific need for technology-based military advantage in 
Australia’s region.11 A strategy of air and maritime denial coupled with a relative capability 
advantage has become a staple feature of Australian strategic guidance and force structure 
planning since. 
 
Relative advantage was further expanded throughout the 1990s in tandem with the so-called 
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)12 to incorporate popular Western ideas which emphasised 
information-superiority in the coordination of military forces, leading to an emphasis of what 
Australia termed the ‘knowledge edge.’13 Technology was considered to be a force multiplier, a 
critical enabler and a means for coordinating joint forces to disproportionately increase their 
combat effectiveness. By the 2000s, the concept included new military-scientific concepts, in 
particular Network-Centric Warfare (NCW) and Network-Enabled Capability (NEC),14 which 
feature prominently in Australia’s defence vernacular,15 and is termed strategic capability 
                                                          
11
 Dibb, "The self-reliant defence of Australia: the history of an idea," 19-20 
12
 Benbow, Tim, The magic bullet? understanding the Revolution in Military Affairs London: Brassey's, 
2004; Murray, Williamson, "Thinking about revolutions in military affairs," Joint Force Quarterly 16 
1997 
13
  Department of Defence, In search of the knowledge edge: the management component 25 August 
2000; Dibb, Paul, The relevance of the knowledge edge Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies 
Centre, December 1998; Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit, "Knowledge systems 
equipment acquisition projects in Defence," Review of Auditor-General's reports 2000-01: first 
quarter, vol. Audit Report N
o
 11 Canberra: Australian Parliament House, 2000; para.5.4 
14
 Alberts, David S., et al., Network centric warfare: developing and leveraging information superiority 
Washington, DC: US Department of Defense, 2000, Cares, Jeff, Distributed networked 
operations: the foundations of network centric warfare Newport, RI: Alidade Press, 2005, 
Friedman, Norman, Network-Centric Warfare: how navies learned to fight smarter through three 
world wars Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2009; Department of Defence, Defending 
Australia in the Asia Pacific century: Force 2030 Canberra: Defence Publishing Service, 2009, 
para 8.60 
15
 For example, see: Department of Defence, Explaining NCW: Network Centric Warfare Canberra: 
Defence Publishing Service, 2006, Department of Defence, NCW roadmap 2009 Canberra: 
Defence Publishing Service, 2009 
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advantage in current Australian defence policy.16 This evolution of relative advantage 
conceptualised technology as qualitatively superior weapons, essentially the ‘technological 
edge’ of the 1980s, in combination with the communication and intelligence technologies that 
facilitated the ‘knowledge edge’ of the 1990s and the technical and doctrinal expertise to 
maintain and operate a high-technology military.17 This conception of relative advantage has 
been validated by the latest defence white paper and has been widely disseminated in the 
public domain. Community consultation conducted by Defence in 2008 found that a majority of 
respondents supported the maintenance of a capability edge for the ADF in three areas: 
technology, information and training. The community consultation program also reported broad 
support for further investment in high-technology force enablers, such as intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance assets and electronic warfare systems.18 
 
The broad conceptual family of relative advantage in military capability stems from a general 
idea of an edge in military technology that emerged and evolved throughout the period 1970-
2010. For the purposes of the thesis, this period will be broadly labelled the era of self-reliance 
in Australian defence policy.19 Throughout the era of self-reliance a focus on high-technology 
military capability and relative advantage in qualitative terms has underpinned the evolving 
concept of an edge. An umbrella term for the concept under examination is ‘relative qualitative 
advantage in military capability and systems.’ For the purpose of clarity this can be shortened 
                                                          
16
 Department of Defence, Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific century: Force 2030, para 8.53; see 
also Department of Defence, Defence 2000: our future defence force Canberra: Commonwealth 
of Australia, 2000 
17
 O'Hanlon, Michael E, technological change and the future of warfare Washington, DC: Brookings 
Institution Press, 2000; Korb, Lawrence J., "Requirements of a high-tech military: manpower and 
organization," Technology and strategy: future trends,  (ed.) Shai Feldman, vol. Conference 
highlights, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Israel, 21-24 March 1987 Boulder, San Francisco 
and Oxford: Westview Press, 1990; Mandeles, Mark D., The future of war: organizations as 
weapons Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2005 
18
 Department of Defence, Looking over the horizon: Australians consider Defence Canberra: Defence 
Publishing Service, December 2008, 13-7 
19
 See White, "Four decades of the Defence of Australia: reflections on Australian defence policy over the 
past 40 years,"   
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to: relative advantage. Relative advantage has featured prominently in discussions regarding 
Australia’s force structure and posture, major acquisitions and strategic policy. The fundamental 
principle of investing in high-technology weapon platforms and systems has become widely 
accepted by politicians, the bureaucracy and the Australian public.20 The 2009 defence white 
paper explicitly prioritised investment in the exploitation and application of ‘new advanced 
technologies’21 in order to offset some of Australia ‘s strategic constraints,22 chief among them 
an exceptionally weak force-to-space ratio.23 
 
Relative advantage has been employed in one way with great consistency: as a policy solution 
to Australia’s strategic circumstances. Although relative advantage is not the only solution 
presented, it is a significant conceptual approach to mitigate the gross disparity between 
Australia’s landmass and maritime patrol zones and the size and capacity of the ADF. 
Politicians, bureaucrats and analysts are often preoccupied with searching for a solution to 
confounding policy challenges. Political concepts and policies are often deployed as solutions to 
problems. In practice, none has been.24 The norm lies with gradated policy effects: incremental 
changes which unfold in a largely unpredictable and recursive pattern. From an analytical 
perspective, the effectiveness of a policy is not measured strictly by its performance against its 
objectives, but also by the effect it had on the nature of the issue it was intended to address and 
whether or not it opened new avenues for future action.25 However, the general policy impetus 
to search for a new solution when merged with the infatuation of Western militaries with high-
tech military platforms leads to a technocratic imperative. This has manifested in Australian 
                                                          
20
Department of Defence, Looking over the horizon: Australians conider Defence, 13-7 
21
 Department of Defence, Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific century: Force 2030, para 8.57 
22
 Ibid., para 8.54 
23
 Evans, Michael, "Australia and the quest for the knowledge edge," Joint Force Quarterly (30) 2002 
24
 Morone, James A., "Seven Laws of Policy Analysis," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 5(4) 
1986 
25
 Ibid. 
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strategic policy as a penchant for high-tech solutions to fundamental strategic and operational 
challenges, despite a rising potential for concomitant ‘technology traps.’26 
  
The dominant technocratic rationale27 in Australia’s strategic policy discourse and has been 
used to justify large capital expenditure in capability debates, the acquisition of in-service 
military platforms and in current procurement policy.28 Yet, the validity of the strategic imperative 
to pursue relative advantage has not been substantiated or debated in policy, strategic guidance 
from political leaders or through policy analysis. This suggests that the underlying principle of 
relative advantage, that is a perceived need for the Australia to maintain a defence force that is 
technologically advanced relative to potential adversaries,29 has become entrenched in the way 
key policy makers understand Australia’s strategic circumstances and needs. In this sense, it is 
an institutional idea: an idea which is embedded in the logic common to an institution which is 
self-reinforcing.30 In Searle’s terminology, this situation represents an institutional fact: social 
facts which are common to a group and are often self-referential in the sense that they create 
the circumstances they represent.31 Thus, for an institutional fact to exist, it must be accepted as 
existing. This is different to objective facts, which are true without agreement or consensus.32 
 
                                                          
26
 Bennett, Frederick Nils, The amateur managers: a study of the management of weapons system 
projects Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 1990, 61-5 
27
 Technocracy is not unique to matters of Defence and is prevalent in a wide variety of public policy 
debates. See Fenna, Alan, Australian public policy Sydney: Pearson Longman, 2004 11 
28
 Department of Defence, Defence capability plan 2009: December 2010 update ; see also Joint 
Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, Australian defence procurement Canberra: Australian 
Government Publishing Service, November 1979 
29
 It is important to note that the specific adversaries envisaged in this concept have changed over time. 
30
 McDonald, Terrence J., "Institutionalism and Institutions in the Stream of History," Polity 28(1) 1995; 
see also Schmidt, Vivien A., Analyzing Ideas and Tracing Discursive Interactions in Institutional 
Change: From Historical Institutionalism to Discursive Institutionalism Washington, DC: 2-5 
September 2010. 
31
 Searle, John R., The social construction of reality New York: The Free Press, 1995 34 
32
 For example, a mountain remains the same geographical feature regardless of whether or not people 
agree what it is. Conversely, money has no inherent value and is only valuable to the extent that 
people in a community agree to attribute value to it. See Ibid. 32-3 
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Representing the edge 
Viewing relative advantage as an institutional idea or fact highlights the role that it may play in 
shaping perceptions of Australia’s circumstances. This is important because institutional facts 
underwrite the perceptions of key decision makers.33 Political ideas in general, including 
institutional facts, also underpin constellations of concepts which frame the ways in which 
political actors interpret events.34 Political leaders, like all human beings, have interpretive 
schemes which they use to understand policy issues.35 These perceptions are influenced by 
institutional facts and contexts and, once entrenched, they often endure despite changing 
circumstances because they provide the basis for an individual’s conception of the world.36 The 
ideas which inform a leader’s worldview are important to understanding their decision-making 
process because ideas influence policy agendas, validate assumptions about political issues 
and can legitimate particular institutions or policies.37 Because leaders approach policy 
challenges within the context of their individual worldview, knowledge, values and experience, 
political ideas like relative advantage can potentially be integral to key decisions even if they do 
not have a direct bearing on the issue at hand. A concept that reflects the scope of the influence 
that longstanding ideas can have on the policy process is Vickers’ appreciative system, which 
encapsulates the combination of ‘values, preferences, norms and ideas’ used by humans to 
understand the world.38 
                                                          
33
 Breuning, Marijke, Foreign Policy Analysis: A Comparative Introduction New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2007 54 
34
 Goldstein, Judith and Keohane, Robert O. , "Ideas and foreign policy: an analytical framework," Ideas 
and foreign policy: beliefs, institutions, and political change,  (eds.) Judith Goldstein and 
Keohane, Robert O. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993; 12-4 
35
 Fiske, Susan T. and Taylor, Shelley E., Social cognition: from brains to culture Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage, 2013 6-7; see also Vickers, Geoffrey, Making institutions work New York: Wiley, 1973 122 
36
 Breuning, Foreign Policy Analysis: A Comparative Introduction 54 
37
 Beland, Daniel, "Ideas, institutions, and policy change," Journal of European Public Policy 16(5) 2009; 
see also: Quirk, Paul J., "Book reviews: public policy," Journal of Policy Analysis and 
Management 5(3) 1986 
38
 Rein, Martin and Schon, Donald, "Reframing policy discourse," The argumentative turn in policy 
analysis and plannign,  (eds.) Frank Fischer and Forester, John Durham and London: Duke 
University Press, 1993; 146 
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The role of relative advantage in influencing policy it is not limited to a matter of perception. It is 
also active in shaping and influencing policy decisions, primarily through discourse. Leaders use 
terms which re-emerge in political rhetoric and can influence institutions by legitimating certain 
ideas and values. The rhetoric of speeches, memos and guidance delivered by leaders can 
legitimate specific terms and ideas in four ways: institutional or personal authority, by reference 
to value systems, by reference to goals and exercise of institutional action and through political 
narrative which reward legitimate ideas and punish defection.39 In particular, the legitimation of 
ideas and terms through policy narrative, which marginalises defection from key concepts,40 can 
create a dominant discourse in which it is difficult to challenge or alter ideas. Frequent 
reinforcement of a dominant discourse through pervasive institutional adoption makes it very 
difficult to challenge the political concepts associated with the discourse within a bureaucratic 
knowledge community.41  Because the discourse employs political concepts that contain the 
fundamental assumptions, conceptual tools and appreciative systems used to interpret policy 
issues and formulate policy, the range of options perceived by actors and the prioritisation of 
policy issues becomes skewed and this constrains policy action.42 
 
                                                          
39
 van Leeuwen, Theo, Discourse and Practice : New Tools for Critical Analysis Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008; see also Hajer, Maarten A. and Laws, David, "Ordering through discourse," The 
Oxford handbook of public policy,  (eds.) Michael J. Moran, Rein, Martin and Goodin, Robert E. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006 and van Eeten, Michael, J. G., "Narrative policy analysis," 
Handbook of public policy analysis: theory, politics, and methods,  (eds.) Frank Fischer, Miller, 
Gerald J. and Sidney, Mara S. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 2006 
40
 Fairclough elaborates on this in his discussion of the technologisation of discourse, one aspect of which 
is the standardisation of discourse practices. See Fairclough, Norman, "The technologisation of 
discourse," Texts and Practices: Readings in Critical Discourse Analysis,  (eds.) Carmen Rosa 
Caldas-Coulthard and Coulthard, Malcolm London and New York: Routledge, 2002; 73, 7 
41
 Börzel, Tanja A., "Organizing Babylon - On the Different Conceptions of Policy Networks," Public 
Administration 76(2) 1998; Hage, Jerald, et al., "Ideas, innovations, and networks: a new policy 
model based on the evolution of knowledge," Policy Sciences 46(2) 2013 
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Michael J. Moran, Rein, Martin and Goodin, Robert E. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006; 
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Relative advantage can be conceptualised as an institutional idea that has been incorporated 
into the current approach to conceiving strategic issues and appropriate policy responses. That 
paradigm fundamentally shapes Australia’s strategic outlook and is, therefore, of paramount 
significance to understanding Australian defence policy. This raises several contingent 
questions. First, has relative advantage been used in discourse as a prescriptive concept or a 
descriptor? In other words, is relative advantage a concept that is applied in force structure 
planning and then reported on or shorthand used to explain decisions already made for other 
reasons? Second, is it used for other reasons not related to force planning? Some other 
purposes for relative advantage could include reassuring or deterring other states and validating 
defence expenditure to the Australian public. Third, has relative advantage created a discourse 
trap in which Australia has explicitly linked its credibility and force structure planning to 
advanced military technology to the extent that opposition is discouraged or marginalised? 
 
In order to answer these questions, a mixed-method Qualitative Data Analysis (QDA) research 
model was used to capture and analyse empirical data drawn from the official Australian 
strategic policy discourse during the era of self-reliance. The model utilised a quantitative 
Content Analysis (CA) method to identify the policy contexts of key concepts, such as capability, 
advantage or edge and technology. It then used a thematic narrative analysis43 of the data set 
to identify themes in the data. The data set was then divided into four discrete periods according 
to key themes in primary policy documents. This periodisation was informed by a review of 
policy documents and then validated by CA and Key Words in Context (KWIC) analyses.44 
Finally, themes identified by the narrative analysis were used in a matrix comparison query to 
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 Bryman, Alan, Social research methods Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012 578-81 
44
 Bernard, H. Russell and Ryan, Gerry W., Analyzing Qualitative Data: Systematic Approaches London: 
Sage, 2010 191-3 
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demonstrate correlations between conceptual transformations in relative advantage and 
contextual factors. 
 
The data set included all principal policy documents released in the public domain and selected 
public speeches and statements made by the Prime Minister and Minister for Defence, as the 
two most authoritative sources of credible signalling of Australia’s strategic policy,  regarding 
military capability and relative advantage. 45 Selection criteria for inclusion in the data set was 
reference to any issue relevant to: existing or planned military capability at the strategic level, 
capability development and force structure planning, the role of technology in force posture or 
employment decisions, the use of military technology to provide security to the Australian public, 
the adoption of military capabilities or technologies that influenced concepts of operations or 
military doctrine, Australia’s strategic interests or objectives, the scope of Australia’s military 
interests and the signalling of Australia’s intentions vis-à-vis any of the above. Not included in 
the data set were items which related to: specific operational-level policies,46 policy 
implementation and specific material procurement projects. The scope of the discourse was 
delineated by the relevance of modes of communication in influencing common conceptions of 
political concepts.47 Thus, strategic-level communication was prioritised as it is more likely to 
influence strategic-level political concepts than discourse reflecting policy machinations.  
 
The data set was used to examine three core variables. The first variable examines the policy 
context in which relative advantage has been used and elements of that context which 
correspond with conceptual changes within and across periods. The first step in establishing the 
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 See appendices A-C for details 
46
 The term operational is used here in the public policy sense, rather than the military sense. The military 
equivalent would be the tactical level of analysis. See Gyngell, Allan and Wesley, Michael, 
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policy context is a qualitative examination of the use of key terms in discourse. Specifically, 
terms which relate to technology, capability and advantage are counted and analysed. The CA 
is followed by a KWIC analysis of key terms to verify contextual usage. This indicates the 
meaning attributed to key terms by political organisations and leaders in each period. The 
second step is an examination of the scope of Australia’s strategic interests and objectives as 
communicated in official documents and by political leaders in public addresses and 
Parliamentary questions. This indicates the potential strategic reach of relative advantage. The 
final step involves measuring the emphasis placed on referents of relative advantage. The 
referent actor(s) for the concept are the state or states that a military advantage is intended to 
be relative to. This determines the quality and type of capabilities required to maintain an 
advantage relative to the capabilities of the states identified. 
 
The second variable is the role of institutional ideas in shaping conceptual change.48 The most 
important institutional ideas to relative advantage are dominant approaches to force structure 
planning and force employment concepts of operations. These ideas may also indicate the 
degree of influence that the availability of new technologies had on force structure planning and 
whether strategic objectives determined capability needs or available capability influenced 
Australia’s strategic ambition. Another key institutional idea is the role of technology in how the 
purpose of relative advantage is conceptualised, what technology or capability is intended to do 
within the concept and what the purpose of relative advantage was in achieving the strategic 
objectives of the time. The role of technology in institutional thinking establishes the purpose of 
the concept: what it is intended to do in terms of strategic objectives. It also conceptualises how 
technology is intended to be used to achieve this purpose. These considerations are 
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 Lieberman, Robert C., "Ideas, Institutions, and Political Order: Explaining Political Change," The 
American Political Science Review 96(4) 2002; Campbell, John L., "Ideas, Politics, and Public 
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interrelated. For example, if the technological level is primarily about a) an expansion base for 
the actual capability we want and b) signalling Australia’s industrial strengths to adversaries, 
allies and the Australian public, then there is a discrete relationship between the purpose of 
technology, as an expansion base, and the purpose of generating and sustaining the terminal 
force.  
 
The third variable is communicating and signalling intentions. At the highest level, this is 
performed by the Prime Minister and Minister for Defence. At the organisational level, strategic 
signalling is performed by the Department of Defence and the ADF. The combination of policy 
statements which signal political intent with demonstrations that show the ADF to be a skilled 
and formidable military creates the ADFs force posture.49 The political communication of the 
relative advantage concept demonstrates themes in the discourse that are directed toward three 
audiences: potential adversaries, allies and regional security partners, and the Australian public. 
This variable examines signalling themes that relate to deterring potential adversaries or 
competitors, reassurance of allies and regional security partners, and validation of Australia’s 
capacity for self-reliant defence to the public. Validation to the public also involves justification 
for significant defence procurement expenditure and provides a discursive mechanism in the 
public policy process. 
 
Findings 
Although the need for a qualitative ‘edge’ has been reiterated in consistent ways in policy and 
rhetoric, the meaning of the concept has changed over time. The conceptual evolution of 
relative advantage has occurred in four phases, which have emphasised credibility, expansion, 
material advantage and coordination advantage. In its first manifestation, during the period 
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 Australian Defence Force, Foundations of Australian military doctrine Canberra: Defence Publishing 
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1968-1979, relative advantage accentuated Australia’s credibility as a reliable and capable 
security partner to its regional allies.50 After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, concerns that 
global conflict could seriously threaten Australia’s security affected attitudes towards defence 
planning and lagging progress towards greater self-reliance promised in 1976. Subsequently, 
defence debates gravitated toward the use of technology as a base for expansion from a small 
core force to a larger “terminal”51 fighting force. In 1985, then Defence minister, Kim Beazley 
appointed Paul Dibb to conduct a review of Australia’s defence capabilities which became the 
basis for the 1987 white paper. The new approach to technology mandated a clear 
technological advantage in military capability relative to Australia’s regional neighbours.52 As 
Australia encountered the RMA in the 1990s, the role of technology was expanded to include 
force multiplication, critical enabling and coordination for joint forces in order to 
disproportionately increase the ADFs combat effectiveness. 
 
1968-1979: Emergence of the relative advantage concept 
In 1968, Australian policy began to specifically consider independent defence capability in the 
context of limited self-reliance. A “self-contained” force was deemed to be best suited to both 
Australia’s collective security arrangements and the possibility of sustaining independent joint 
service operations.53 This precursor to self-reliance is qualified by the concurrent needs for self-
reliant capability for the purposes of conducting independent operations and fielding sufficient 
independent capability to avoid charges of excessive alliance free-riding. Despite the new 
emphasis on greater self-reliance, the 1968 strategic basis of Australian defence policy also 
stipulated that the most likely deployment of Australian forces would be in the form of a coalition 
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operation led by a major power ally.54 Australia continued to define its interests in terms of the 
security of neighbouring states, lines of communication through maritime Southeast Asia and 
underwriting regional confidence in collective security measures.55 The need to reassure 
regional security partners was evident in the language of the 1972 Australian Defence Review, 
which stipulated requirements for an “increasingly self-reliant” defence force able to “project 
Australian strength” beyond the continent.56 It further stipulated that Australia had allies in the 
region that shared its interests and could be strengthened through political and military 
support.57 
 
Meanwhile, the growing expense of major capital projects initiated during the early 1960s 
became a hot political issue and required frequent justification from the highest levels of 
government. Years before the notion of technological advantage was explicitly expressed in 
policy documents, then Prime Minister John Gorton stated that “on any criterion the second best 
is not good enough for any defence requirement that we have, and it is not too expensive for a 
nation which needs the best in the world.”58 This statement coincided with both statements and 
policy that signalled Australia’s military capability and intentions to regional states, both friendly 
and potentially hostile. Initially, this emphasis was directed toward the issue of deterrence,59 a 
long standing institutional idea within Defence. However, debates about defence expenditure 
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quickly became mired in political contests and often resulted in laundry lists of equipment 
purchases paraded to justify budget peaks and troughs.60  
 
In the early 1970s the tone of Australian policy changed and documents began to emphasise 
credibility rather than deterrence. In 1970 then Minister for Defence Malcolm Fraser’s public 
statements regarding Australia’s strike capability needs stressed the need to be able to 
materially influence stability in the region and frequently referred explicitly to both deterrence 
and reassurance of security partners.61 The earliest example of this shift in policy is the 1971 
strategic basis of Australian defence policy, which pinned “Australia’s political and military 
credibility” to its ability to defend Australian territory, independence and identity.62 The 1972 
Australian Defence Review further specified that Australia’s capability must be both “evident to 
other countries”63 and balanced between offensive and defensive capabilities to ensure that 
“considerations of credibility and or long term deterrence”64 are substantiated. Demonstrating 
the credibility of Australia’s defence capability and commitment to collective security was as an 
important policy imperative,65 reinforced by the view that Australia’s military capability was to 
some degree the “currency of diplomacy and of deterrence in the region.”66 Defence policy 
underscored the need to use Australia’s technical and industrial strength, political stability and 
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military capabilities to reassure regional allies and assuage their misgivings regarding 
Australia’s ability and intention to influence their security in the event of a crisis.67 
 
In 1973, policy linked Australia’s ability to “demonstrate a military capability that lends credibility 
and authority to [its] foreign policy”68 with technological advantage. In this view Australia’s 
unique position in the region was underpinned by its “resources, technology, and ability to 
operate and maintain more advanced military equipment”69 than local states. The issue of 
Australia’s increasingly independent foreign policy became a political football, with the criticism 
that Australian policy “lacked credibility if based on a weak or misplaced defence policy.”70 The 
result was that “assured defence strength in being”71 was held to be integral to legitimating self-
reliance and commitments to regional security cooperation72 that were based on Australia’s 
military posture. Meanwhile, Sir Arthur Tange was substantially reforming the Department of 
Defence and recommended changes in the way Defence prioritised capability decisions to 
ensure that procurement served Australia’s self-reliance needs.73 The Defence Committee had 
noted that Australia enjoyed relative wealth and technological advantage over the countries of 
Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific. In combination with Australia’s privileged access to 
advanced military technology, Australia’s wealth enabled it to field military capabilities beyond 
the reach of its regional neighbours.74 
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The language used in 1976 in Australia’s first defence white paper introduced a new tone to the 
discussion of the technological level of military capability. The white paper noted that Australia 
ought to be “seen as a nation that takes defence matter seriously” and that the newly formed 
Australian Defence Force should have “capabilities and competence” that commanded 
respect.75 It further stated that, as a requirement for defence capability, the ADF “should at all 
times demonstrate Australia’s serious attitude to defence matters, military competence and 
capacity to absorb and operate high-technology equipments.”76 During this period, Prime 
Minister Fraser often referred publicly to the ADFs technological level, to the need for greater 
capacity for independent operations and the benefits of greater burden sharing.77 Thus, as the 
focus on reinforcing Australia’s image as a credible ally began to diversify to include more 
capacity to undertake military action in Southeast Asia, coherence between signals sent to 
various authors also began to diverge.  
 
1980-1986: the technical level as a basis for expansion 
The 1976 white paper had grand designs for the new role of the ADF and promises of healthy 
investment in new capabilities and infrastructure from the Fraser government. What it lacked 
was a clear idea of how it would translate its new resources into strategic outcomes.78 A first 
step toward rectifying this was a range of inquiries, both public and private, into Australia’s 
strategic circumstances. The 1981 Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence inquiry 
report on threats to Australia’s security found four basic types of threats: global war, invasion of 
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Australia, intermediate threats to Australian interests and low level contingencies.79 The report 
concluded that even though the likelihood of any major threat was very low the ADF needed to 
retain high technology capabilities with long lead times in order to hedge against the rapid 
development of offensive capabilities by a regional power and to “act as a deterrent to hostile 
action.”80 A challenge to this conclusion is that being able to meet a challenge is not necessarily 
the same thing as deterring it.81 Deterrence must not only apply to attacks of many varieties, but 
also to threats of attack.82 
 
An important ideational carryover from the Forward Defence era was the concept of a force in 
being or core force that would provide an expansion base for a rapid increase in the size of the 
ADF in response to an emerging threat.83 Ostensibly this would provide a wide ranging deterrent 
at an acceptable cost. One difficulty in maintaining a core force was ensuring that it could 
provide an acceptable base for expansion. A senate inquiry into the Australian Army tabled in 
1974 identified three points which it found underpinned the concept of an expansion base. The 
first was that there is a critical minimum-sized Army, below which “the nation ceases to have a 
useful asset.” The second was that Australian forces should be organised, trained and equipped 
primarily as a base for expansion in the event of a contingency. Thirdly, that parliament and 
government must be prepared to respond to any deterioration in Australia’s “advantageous 
strategic and technological position.”84 Concurrently, Prime Ministerial statements assured the 
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public that military modernisation programs would ensure that Australia continued to field most 
technologically advanced equipment available to it.85 
 
In 1982 the higher defence machinery review found that the concepts of versatility and 
adaptability used in force structure planning were appropriate as a basis for defence planning.86 
The review noted organisational concerns regarding the ambiguities between the roles of the 
Force Structure Committee and the Force Development and Analysis Division87 and the lack of 
input from the Force Development Branch in shaping strategic guidance.88 This was problematic 
because the Australian Strategic Analysis and Defence Policy Objectives (ASADPO) document 
did not “provide sufficient guidance, particularly for the purpose of determining relative priorities 
for the development of Defence Force capabilities.”89  The 1984 Parliament inquiry report the 
Australian Defence Force: its structure and capabilities found that strategic guidance from 
government was inadequate and that Australia lacked appropriate organisational machinery for 
translating national security objectives into strategic concepts and force structure.90 Thus, long 
held ideas and debates needed to be set aside to ensure that progress could be made toward 
delivering on the high-technology self-reliant ADF promised in earlier policy guidance. 
 
In response to criticism of the government’s investment in the ANZUS alliance, then Minister for 
Defence Ian Sinclair shifted emphasis in his strategic calculus away from global level threats 
and towards regional contingencies in which Australia would expect to operate more 
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independently and in which a technological basis for expansion was integral.91 Amidst the 
changing focus of ongoing force structure and defence policy debates, Sinclair made frequent 
reference to material capabilities being acquired by government,92 although these not regularly 
linked to specific strategic policy outcomes or requirements. After the 1983 change of 
government, incoming Prime Minister Bob Hawke quickly signalled his government’s intentions 
to maintain Australia’s commitments to its great power and regional security alliances and to 
reform defence policy to provide for a force structure which effectively utilised military 
technology and afforded the ADF a qualitative advantage in Southeast Asia.93 Soon after, then 
Minster for Defence Gordon Scholes articulated a comprehensive approach to defence policy 
which would become a significant aspect of strategic guidance for policy formation. Scholes 
used the term “graduated readiness”94 to describe his thinking on how best to manage 
modernisation and budget constraints. Political needs such managing public expectations 
regarding defence expenditure and reassuring allies that a new government would maintain 
committed to long-standing relationships had a strong correlation with new expressions of 
technological advantage in the mid-1980s. 
 
1987-1996: technological edge 
By late 1984 Defence had become dysfunctional and mired in intra-organisational 
disagreements over definitional and conceptual issues that presented an obstacle to meaningful 
policy development.95 Then Defence minister, Kim Beazley appointed Paul Dibb to conduct a 
review of Australia’s defence capabilities in 1985 and the seminal report was delivered in 
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1986.96 The next Defence white paper was released in 1987 and was substantially founded on 
the approach to defence planning outlined in the Dibb report. During the transition from the old 
policy approach to the new, Beazley reiterated the phrase defence in depth to stress the 
importance afforded to demonstrating Australia’s material capacity to defend itself with a high-
technology defence force.97 References to military technology where subsequently linked to 
assertions that Australia’s capacity for self-reliance was credible and desirable.98 Beazley 
framed DOA as a catalyst for change in the politics of defence. Changing ideational norms in 
the debate were, in Beazley’s view, necessary to accommodate the new concepts used in 
planning and structuring the ADF and major platform acquisitions.99 Without contradicting the 
constellation of concepts that underpinned DOA, Beazley also made direct reference to the 
need to reassure allies of Australia’s commitment to its security relationships and indicated that 
a high-tech ADF provided material benefits to those relationships.100 
 
In 1989 the government released a new defence policy document, Australia’s strategic planning 
in the 1990s, which set strategic level guidance for force acquisition priories to Defence and 
explained and validated capital expenditure to the public.101 The strategic planning document 
noted the changing security dynamics in Southeast Asia, and the world, and linked force 
structure decisions to military capabilities which it stated were  essential in securing Australia’s 
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national interests. As the 1980s drew to a close, Hawke also questioned the implications of 
strategic changes in the region in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union and asserted 
that Australia’s high-technology military would become an integral component of regional 
stability and security in the 1990s. For example, Hawke noted that: 
The size of our economy, and our technical expertise, means that Australia will 
continue to maintain significant military capabilities, especially maritime 
capabilities, which will allow us to make a valuable contribution to the military 
dimension of regional security.102 
 
At this point, the requirement for Australia to sustain a clear technological lead over its region 
went largely unchallenged. Ministerial statements signalled a willingness to continue to spend 
on high-technology systems and platforms in order to ensure that Australia continued to be seen 
as a credible ally, that the ADF was recognised as a well-equipped and formidable force, and 
that the public was reassured that defence expenditure was purposeful. However, the role that 
technology played in delivering Australia’s edge had already begun to change. 
 
As early as the 1991 force structure review,103  Australia began referring to military technology in 
terms of coordination. The review made note of the new roles played by information 
technologies in enabling the military to operate more effectively.104 Minster for Defence, Robert 
Ray noted that Australians has come to believe that Australia could defend itself in accordance 
with the central principles of DOA.105 This perception allowed political actors to reduce their 
focus on credibility and place more emphasis on material capability, which had come to the 
forefront of many defence debates since DOA was released. Technology emerged as a 
                                                          
102
 Hawke, R. J. L., Australia's Security in Asia The Asia-Australia Institute, University of New South 
Wales, Sydney: 24 May 1991; 12. 
103
 Department of Defence, Force structure review Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 
May 1991 
104
 Ibid., para 2. 
105
 Ray, R. F., Address to the RSL Victorian Branch VRC Function Centre Flemington: 3 July 1991. 
 
 
 
 
26 
 
discussion point in its own right. The 1993 strategic review was the first document to expressly 
link military technology with interoperability,106 noting that 
The overall development of the ADF will need to have a particular emphasis on 
the key principles of joint operations, the selective application of advanced 
technology, the promotion of competence and professionalism, and the 
application of a rigorous approach to preparedness.107 
 
Ray noted interoperability requirements as a driver for high-technology military platforms when 
referring to relative advantage, but sometimes situated it within a broader commitment to 
alliances, including but not limited to ANZUS.108 This coincided with Keating’s push for greater 
engagement with Asia and may reflect political needs within government to ensure that public 
statements were signalling positive intentions vis-à-vis other policy priority areas. 
 
Throughout the early 1990s it became clear that DOA did not account for the extensive 
transition of the strategic landscape in the Asia-Pacific region from the relatively banal Asian 
security environment of the previous 20 years of the Cold War to the much more dynamic post-
Cold War period. Two significant indicators that the doctrinal approach to defence embedded in 
DOA needed revision were tensions over North Korea’s nuclear program in 1994 and the 
Taiwan Strait crisis of 1996. A third challenge was the increasing likelihood that Australia might 
deploy forces to maintain stability in the regional neighbourhood.109 Political actors realised that 
the thinking which had underpinned thee 1987 and 1994 white papers110 required adjustment 
and set about commissioning a new policy document which could incorporate systemic changes 
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to the security situation in Asia and new concepts about harnessing information technologies 
with strategic guidance which altered but did not abandon central facets of existing defence 
policy which drew on key themes from DOA. 
 
1997-2009: capability advantage 
After the change of government in 1996, policymakers resolved to generate a new policy 
guidance document for Australia’s defence planning. The Howard government identified three 
ways in which DOA needed revision. First, by widening the scope of Australia’s regional 
interests from Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific to the broader Asia-Pacific region in 
order to include substantial developments in North Asia which affected the security environment 
elsewhere. Second, by overtly acknowledging the potential for great power tension in the region 
due to China’s rise. Third, by raising the profile of peacekeeping and humanitarian operations in 
Australia’s strategic priorities.111 This widening of Australia’s security outlook coincided with a 
change in focus for the way technology was conceptualised in defence policy and statements. 
The rhetoric of the early 1990s, which remained locked on material capability, largely faded 
away when faced with the new technological paradigm of the RMA. 
 
In the late 1990s, technology became central to Australia’s ‘knowledge edge’112  and enabled 
the ADF to coordinate its force elements to a much greater degree than had previously be 
possible. Information and communications technologies were viewed as the ultimate kind of 
relative advantage in the contemporary strategic environment. The 1997 Australia’s strategic 
policy document placed the knowledge edge at the top of the government’s list of defence 
capability priorities, stating that 
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Our highest capability development priority therefore is ‘the knowledge edge,’ 
that is, the effective exploitation of information technologies to allow us to use our 
relatively small force to maximum effectiveness.113 
 
Material capabilities now took a back seat to the capacity for coordination that might allow a 
small nation to increase its strategic weight. This reflected a powerful notion of technocracy 
which had swept through Western defence establishments.114 The government signalled to both 
external and internal audiences that Network Enabled Capability would deliver significant gains 
in the ADFs capacity to win conflicts and that it was, for the Australian public, also a worthwhile 
investment 
 
Then Minister for Defence, Ian McLachlan noted his intention that the document would boost 
public confidence in the government’s approach to defence in the foreword of the report. 
I hope this document gives all Australians a sound understanding of those 
challenges. But more importantly, I am confident it also provides reassurance 
that the Government is putting in place a strategic approach to ensure those 
challenges are met.115 
 
 McLachlan also noted that the government no longer prioritised the universal purchase of high-
technology equipment, stating that 
In the past Australia benefited from being the most developed economy in our 
region, holding the most advanced military equipment and weapons. In some 
defence areas, that is no longer the case. To stay confident in our ability to 
defend Australia, we must be more efficient and smarter in using resources.116 
 
The rationale for this significant shift in approach to conceptualising relative advantage was 
linked to changing Australian perceptions of power relativities, particularly those in Asia.117 This 
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theme would soon re-emerge in policy statements and influenced the creation of a new defence 
white paper in 2000. 
 
Our future defence force118 was the Howards government’s second major defence policy 
document and solidified many of the ideas which had taken hold within defence since Australia’s 
strategic policy. It introduced the term ‘capability edge’ into the popular defence vernacular and 
announced that “Australia’s defence planning should aim to provide our forces with a clear 
margin of superiority against any credible adversary.”119 The 2000 white paper was also 
separated technology from other capabilities and treated it as a discrete capability area. After 
9/11 defence policy took a rapid turn away from self-reliance and toward expeditionary 
operations. The defence updates in 2003, 2005 and 2007,120 took Australia further from 
fundamental DOA concepts and emphasised interoperability and coalition operations as a driver 
of capability development.121 It was not until the next change of government that defence policy 
would be directed back toward the conceptualisation of technological edge within the context of 
the defence of Australia. 
 
In the lead up to the 2009 Defence white paper, Force 2030: Defending Australia in the Asia-
Pacific century, Defence undertook wide community consultation. This consultation process 
found that a majority of respondents supported the maintenance of a capability edge for the 
ADF in three areas: technology, information and training. The community consultation program 
also reported broad support for further investment in high-technology force enablers, such as 
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intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets and electronic warfare systems.122 The 
subsequent white paper used the phrase strategic capability advantage to illustrate the new 
government’s conception of relative advantage.123  The 2009 white paper overtly prioritised 
investment in the exploitation and application of ‘new advanced technologies’124 in order to 
mitigate some of Australia’s strategic limitations.125 It also, quite controversially, linked 
Australia’s strategic concerns to Chinas rise, sending strong signals to the international 
community about Australia’s ongoing commitment to international security. By this point, 
Australia’s declared intentions related more to acquiring communication technologies to 
enhance coordination between force elements rather than strictly the material advantage of 
specific platforms. 
 
Conclusions 
The concept of relative advantage has changed significantly throughout its short history. It 
began as a limited concept, tied heavily to Australia’s need to be seen as credible alongside the 
declining presence of its major power allies in the region. It then broadened to include the 
technological level, which saw Australia as empowered by its industrial capacity and focused on 
the capacity for rapid expansion to a high-technology terminal force. In the DOA period, 
technology was no longer primarily viewed as a base for expansion and became an integral 
component of how Australia would conduct strategic denial in order to demonstrate a credible 
self-reliant capacity for defence. After the RMA, capability advantage related to the capacity to 
conduct and coordinate joint operations to substantially increase the sum of the ADFs parts. 
This suggests that the evolution of relative advantage primarily reflects changing political 
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imperatives to employ the central idea in different ways in order to dominate strategic policy 
discourse in a variety of contexts and for different purposes. 
 
The primary drivers of change for relative advantage have related to political needs rather than 
strict and internally-consistent policy impetus. In particular, politicians have utilised relative 
advantage as a dominant discourse in defence debates to reflect and often legitimate political 
goals relating to: changing policy contexts, and in particular changes to the scope of Australia's 
strategic ambitions and the referent actor(s) of relative advantage; strategic concepts, especially 
exogenous institutional ideas which changed and where relative advantage changed to reflect 
them, such as ideas about force posturing, military options and the way technology should be 
used to enhance military capability; and different communication needs, particularly the need to 
send different signals to various audiences to facilitate other policy objectives. 
Therefore, relative advantage has been both descriptive and prescriptive, but has largely 
described decisions made for a range of reasons not necessarily limited to technological 
necessity. It was clearly used for purposes beyond force structure panning and especially as a 
tool to reassure internal and external audiences of Australia’s capacity to contribute to allies and 
to defend itself unaided against a credible threat. Relative advantage also has signs of being a 
discourse trap insofar as it has created an expectation, as demonstrated by the 2008 defence 
community consultation program,126 that Australia will retain a technological lead over regional 
militaries even as they modernise and that the ADF needs to field the most advanced 
capabilities practically available to it in order to defend Australia and its interests. 
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Appendix A: Primary Policy Documents 
Period Documents 
1968-1979 Department of Defence (1972). Australian Defence Review. Canberra, 
Australian Government Publishing Service. 
  
Department of Defence (1975). Australian defence : major decisions since 
December 1972. Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service. 
  
Department of Defence (1976). Australian defence. Canberra, Australian 
Government Publishing Service. 
 
1980-1986 Dibb, P. (1986). Review of Australia's defence capabilities. Report for the 
Minister for Defence. Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service. 
  
1987-1996 Department of Defence (1987). The defence of Australia. Canberra, Australian 
Government Publishing Service. 
 
Department of Defence (1989). Australia's strategic planning in the 1990s. 
Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service. 
  
Department of Defence (1991). Force structure review. Canberra, Australian 
Government Publishing Service. DPUBS 35/91. 
  
Department of Defence (1993). Strategic review. Canberra, Australian 
Government Publishing Service. 
  
Department of Defence (1994). Defending Australia. Canberra, Australian 
Government Publishing Service. 
 
1997-2013 Department of Defence (1997). Australia's strategic policy. Canberra, 
Commonwealth of Australia. 
  
Department of Defence (2000). Defence 2000: our future defence force. 
Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia. 
  
Department of Defence (2003). Australia's national security. Canberra, Defence 
Publishing Service. 
  
Department of Defence (2005). Australia's national security: Defence update 
2005. Canberra, Defence Publishing Service. 
  
Department of Defence (2007). Australia's national security. Canberra, Defence 
Publishing Service. 
  
Department of Defence (2009). Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific century: 
Force 2030. Canberra, Defence Publishing Service. 
 
 
Total = 15 
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Appendix B: Prime Ministerial Speeches 
Prime Minister Date Number of documents 
Gorton 1968-1971 144 
McMahon 1971-1972 86 
Whitlam 1972-1975 146 
Fraser 1975-1983 257 
Hawke 1983-1991 327 
Keating 1991-1996 185 
Howard 1996-2007 365 
Rudd 2007-2010 273 
Total = 1,783 
 
Appendix C: Defence Minister Statements 
Minister for Defence Date Number of documents 
Fairhall 1968-1969 8 
Fraser 1969-1971 21 
Gorton 1971-1971 1 
Fairbairn 1971-1972 5 
Barnard 1972-1975 5 
Morrison 1975-1975 6 
Killen 1975-1982 29 
Sinclair 1982-1983 32 
Scholes 1983-1984 7 
Beazley 1984-1990 34 
Ray 1990-1996 47 
McLachlan 1996-1998 5 
Moore 1998-2001 13 
Reith 2001-2001 21 
Hill 2001-2006 108 
Nelson 2006-2007 26 
Fitzgibbon 2007-2009 14 
Total = 382 
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